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Abstract
We study the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of pre-
dictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration
from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using
plant-level data for the UKmanufacturing sector. Most importantly, and consistent with
the property right theory of integration, we find that the technology intensity of down-
stream (producer) industries are positively correlated with the likelihood of integration
whereas the intensity of upstream (supplier) industries are negatively correlated with it.
Also consistent with theory, both correlations are stronger when the supplying industry
accounts for a large fraction of the producer’s costs. These results are generally robust
and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation
strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm and industry-level char-
acteristics.
JEL: L22, L23, L24, L60.
Keywords: hold-up, incomplete contracts, internal organization of the firm, invest-
ment, residual rights of control, R&D, technology, UK manufacturing, vertical integra-
tion.
1. Introduction
Despite a large theoretical literature on the determinants of vertical integration, the
economics profession is far from a consensus on the empirical determinants of vertical
integration in general, and the relationship between technological change and vertical
integration in particular.1 This paper provides a simple incomplete contracts model of
vertical integration and, in the light of the predictions of this model, presents detailed
empirical evidence on the determinants of vertical integration using UK firm-level data
over the period 1996-2001.
The two leading theories of vertical integration are the “Transaction Cost Economics”
(TCE) approach of Williamson (1975, 1985) and the “Property Right Theory” (PRT)
approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).2 Both approaches
emphasize the importance of incomplete contracts and ex post opportunistic behavior
(hold up) on ex ante relationship-specific investments. The TCE approach views vertical
integration as a way of circumventing the potential holdup problems. In particular, it
predicts that vertical integration should be more common when there is greater speci-
ficity and holdup is more costly, and that vertical integration should enhance investments
by all contracting parties. The PRT approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role
of ownership of assets as a way of allocating residual rights of control, and emphasizes
both the costs and the benefits of vertical integration in terms of ex ante investment
incentives.
To illustrate the central insight of the PRT, consider a relationship between a sup-
plier (upstream firm) and a (downstream) producer. Moreover, suppose that only two
organizational forms are possible: (backward) vertical integration, where the down-
stream producer buys up the upstream supplier and has residual rights of control, and
non-integration (outsourcing), where the producer and supplier are separate firms. In
this world, vertical integration does not automatically improve efficiency. Instead, by
allocating the residual rights of control to the producer, who has ownership and thus
control of the assets if there is a breakup of the relationship, vertical integration in-
1We discuss the empirical literature below. On the theory side, see, among others, Klein, Crawford
and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1975, 1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
Bolton and Whinston (1993), Aghion and Tirole (1994a,b and 1997) and Legros and Newman (2003),
and the surveys in Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) and Hart (1995). Papers on the potential impact
of technology on vertical integration include, among others, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Athey and
Schmutzler (1995), Breshanan et al. (1999), Helper (1991), Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003), Acemoglu,
Aghion and Zilibotti (2004), and Acemoglu et al. (2008). See also the literature on international trade
and vertical integration (or outsourcing), for example, McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2003), Antras (2003), Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), and Feenstra (1998).
2See Whinston (2001) and Joskow (2003) for recent discussions.
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creases the producer’s bargaining power and encourages its investment. However, by
the same mechanism, it also reduces the supplier’s ex post bargaining power and, hence,
her incentives to invest. Non-integration, on the other hand, gives greater investment
incentives to the supplier. Thus, in contrast to the TCE approach, the PRT predicts
that vertical integration should have opposite effects on the supplier’s and the producer’s
investments. Here, vertical integration has both costs and benefits in terms of ex ante
investments, and its net benefits depend on whether the investments of the producer or
those of the supplier are more important for the output and success of the joint venture.
While the key predictions of the TCE approach could be tested by investigating the
relationship between measures of specificity and vertical integration, as Whinston (2001)
also emphasizes, the PRT approach is more difficult to test directly because it makes
no predictions about the overall relationship between specificity and vertical integra-
tion. However, crucially for our paper, one can test some of its distinctive predictions,
for example that vertical integration has opposite effects on investments by the two
contracting parties.
In this paper, we develop a simple methodology to study the forces emphasized by
the PRT approach. First, we shift the focus from relationship-specific investments to
technology intensity. The presumption is that parties making technology investments,
especially in R&D, are subject to holdup, and this will lead to the type of problems
highlighted by the TCE and PRT approaches.3 Second, we consider the relationship
between pairs of supplying and producing industries and focus on the prediction that
the correlations between vertical integration and the investment incentives of suppliers
and producers should display opposite signs. Our approach therefore exploits cross-
industry (cross-product) implications of the PRT.4
First, we develop these points using a simple theoretical framework and derive a
number of predictions that are testable with the data we have available. The frame-
work highlights that backward vertical integration gives greater investment incentives to
the producer, while forward vertical integration encourages supplier investment. Non-
integration provides intermediate incentives to both parties. This analysis leads to three
3This could be for a variety of reasons. First, R&D investments are often made for technologies
specific to each firm (or their mix of products). Second, associated with any technological investment,
parties are also likely to make specific, non-tangible and largely unverifiable innovative investments.
Finally, market imperfections, for example search frictions, typically turn “technologically general”
investments into specific investments (e.g., Acemoglu, 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).
4Although the specific regressions estimated in this paper are motivated by the PRT approach, the
results are informative about, and could be consistent with, other approaches to vertical integration.
In the concluding section, we discuss how these results could be reconciled with other theories.
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key predictions:
1. The importance of the technology intensity of the producer and supplier should
have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. In particular, while a
higher importance of the producer’s technology intensity should increase the prob-
ability of backward integration, a higher importance of the supplier’s technology
intensity should reduce that probability.
2. Vertical integration should be more responsive to the technology intensities of both
the supplier and the producer when the supplier accounts for a larger fraction of
the input costs of the producer.
3. If the relevant margin of choice is between backward vertical integration and non-
integration, then technology intensity of the supplier should discourage integration,
the technology intensity of the producer should encourage integration, and the
importance of the supplier to the producer (measured in terms of share of costs)
should encourage integration.
We investigate these predictions, and other determinants of vertical integration, using
detailed data on all British manufacturing plants from the UK Census of Production
(ARD). To identify the effects of both supplier and producer technology, we look across
all manufacturing industries. Tomeasure the extent of vertical integration and to develop
an empirical strategy to document the determinants of integration, we need to take a
stance as to whether backward or forward vertical integration is the most important
alternative to non-integration. Motivated by the bulk of the prior empirical work (e.g.,
Joskow, 1987, 2003, Stuckey, 1983), we focus on backward vertical integration.5 Using
this dataset and the UK Input-Output table, we calculate two measures of (backward)
vertical integration, defined at the level of firm-industry-pair (more precisely, for firm i
producing product j with input from industry k).6 The first measure is a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm owns a plant producing input k necessary for product j. The
second measure calculates how much of the inputs from industry k, necessary for the
production of j, the firm can produce in-house. It is useful to emphasize that what we
uncover are correlations, not necessarily causal relations.
5This is also the strategy implicitly adopted in other cross-industry studies of vertical integration;
see, for example, Antras (2003).
6Note that these measures do not distinguish between backward or forward integration, since we do
not observe who has residual rights of control. Nevertheless, conceptually they correspond to measures
of backward integration, since the question is whether firm i is integrated with its upstream suppliers
(rather than firm j being integrated with downstream producers potentially using its inputs).
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Using the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added (calculated from a sample pre-
dating our vertical integration measures), we find the following correlations in the data:
• Consistent with prediction 1 above, technology (R&D) intensities of the producing
(downstream) and supplying (upstream) industries have correlations of opposite
signs with the likelihood of vertical integration.
• Consistent with prediction 2 above, the correlations between vertical integration
and the technology intensities of both the producing and the supplying industry,
are substantially larger and also more significant when the share of costs of the
supplying industry in the total costs of the producing industry (for short, “share
of costs”) is high.
• Consistent with prediction 3 (provided that the relevant margin is between back-
ward vertical integration and non-integration), we also find that technology inten-
sity of the producing industry is associated with more vertical integration, tech-
nology intensity in the supplying industry is associated with less integration, and
the share of costs is associated with more integration.
We subject these basic patterns in the data to a series of robustness checks. The
results are generally robust. First, including a range of firm-level covariates does not
change the relationship between R&D intensity and vertical integration. Second, the
results are broadly similar when we restrict attention to multiplant firms and control
for firm level fixed effects.7 Third, the results are similar when we proxy for technology
intensity by physical investments rather than R&D. Fourth, the results are robust to
excluding top or bottom quartiles of firms by size and to using an alternative measure
of vertical integration. Finally, the results are also similar when we use a probit model
rather than a linear probability model.
We also investigate the relationship between competition (measured as the number
of firms in supplying and producing industries) and vertical integration. Our results
here are consistent with theory, and indicate that having more firms in the supplying
industry reduces the likelihood of vertical integration, while a larger number of firms in
the producing industry increases it.
7In particular, while the main effect of producer R&D intensity is no longer statistically significant,
both supplier R&D intensity and the interaction between both supplier and producer R&D intensities
and share of costs remain significant. When we control for endogenous selection, the effect of producer
R&D intensity is again statistically significant.
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In our regressions, a measure of vertical integration is on the left-hand side, and in-
dustry and firm characteristics are on the right-hand side. However, in theory, and most
likely in practice, vertical integration also affects technology choices. Moreover, other
factors omitted in the regression could influence both vertical integration and technology
intensity, and in a cross-industry regression there are many potential omitted variables.
Although our fixed effects regressions control for many such omitted characteristics,
there is still a concern regarding causality.
As an imperfect attempt at dealing with the endogeneity problem, we report results
where the technology intensity of each industry is instrumented with the technology
intensity of the same industry in the United States. This instrumentation strategy gen-
erally yields results similar to, and in fact quantitatively larger than, the ordinary least
squares strategy.8 Overall, we conclude that there is an interesting pattern in the data,
with technology intensity of producing and supplying industries having opposite effects
on the likelihood of vertical integration. This pattern should be important in evaluat-
ing the predictions of a range of different theories of vertical integration (even though
we have motivated our empirical approach from a specific theory based on incomplete
contracts).9
In addition to the theoretical studies mentioned above, this paper is related to a large
empirical literature on vertical integration. In contrast to our approach, most empirical
studies of vertical integration are motivated by the TCE approach and focus on a single
industry. These include Joskow’s (1987) seminal paper on ownership arrangements in
electricity generating plants, Stuckey’s (1983) study of integration between aluminium
refineries and bauxite mines, Monteverde and Teece’s (1982) investigation of integration
in the automobile industry, Masten’s (1984) work on the aerospace industry, Ohanian’s
(1994) work on the pulp and paper industry, and Klein’s (1998) work on the Fisher
Body and General Motors relationship. More recently, important papers by Baker and
Hubbard (2000, 2002) study the trucking industry, Lerner and Merges (1998) consider
the biotech sector, Woodruff (2002) studies integration in the Mexican footwear indus-
try, Chipty (2001) investigates vertical integration and market foreclosure in the cable
television industry, and Hortacu and Syverson (2005) study vertical integration in the
U.S. cement industry. The only cross-industry evidence relevant to our investigation
8However, when we simultaneously instrument for the main effects and the interaction terms, the
results are imprecisely estimated.
9An additional concern is that our proxies for technological intensity may be correlated with the
relevant demand elasticities and impact vertical integration decision through strategic considerations
— though it unclear how this could generate the opposite-signed patterns that we find robustly in the
data. We leave the exploration of this and other alternative hypotheses to future research.
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of which we are aware is due to Caves and Bradburd (1988), who document a positive
cross-industry correlation between measures of specificity and vertical integration, and
from Antras (2003), who looks at the share of intra-firm imports over total imports for
23 U.S. industries and relates this to capital intensity. We are not aware of any other
papers investigating the prediction that the technology intensity of suppliers and pro-
ducers have opposite effects on vertical integration decisions (see Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) for a recently survey).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and
derives the main testable implications. Section 3 details the construction of our measure
of vertical integration, and also discusses data sources and the construction of the other
key variables. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 discusses robustness checks
and additional tests. Section 6 briefly investigates the effect of competition in producing
and supplying industries on vertical integration. Finally, Section 7 discusses alternative
theoretical approaches that may account for the correlations presented in this paper and
concludes.
2. Theory and Empirical Hypotheses
In this section, we construct a simple theory of the determinants of vertical integration
in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), henceforth GH. The focus is on the relative
importance of technological investments in a bilateral relationship between a producer
and a supplier. In the model, the two parties can either remain as separate entities
(non-integration, NI), or the producer can employ the supplier and become the residual
claimant of the profits generated by the joint venture, (backward vertical integration,
V IB) or the supplier can employ the producer and become the residual claimant (forward
vertical integration, V IF ). As already discussed in the Introduction, when we turn
to data we will focus on backward vertical integration. Nevertheless, it is useful to
understand the implications of the theoretical framework both for backward and forward
integration.
2.1. Model Environment
We consider a one-period relationship between two risk-neutral parties who can under-
take technological investments to increase the productivity of the relationship. Through-
out, we assume these investment decisions to have a specific component in that greater
technology intensity leads to a greater possibility of holdup. Decision rights over these
6
investments cannot be transferred between the two parties, for example, because the
investments require tacit knowledge or human capital. This implies that the producer
cannot make the supplier’s investments, or vice versa. As is standard in this literature,
we assume that the investments and the output of the relationship are non-verifiable.
Consequently, neither contracts conditional on investments nor contracts specifying rules
for ex post revenue-sharing are possible. However, the allocation of property rights (ver-
tical integration or arms’ length) can be designed so as to provide the right incentives
for the non-contractible investments.
We adopt the usual timing assumptions: before investments and production take
place, the parties can choose an organizational form and transfers. We denote the
amount of ex ante transfer to party i conditional on the organizational form z by Ti (z),
where P and S denote the producer and the supplier, respectively. More formally, the
timing of events in this relationship is as follows:
1. The producer offers an organizational form (ownership structure) z ∈ {V IB,NI, V IF}
and associated transfers, TP (z) and TS (z), such that TP (z) + TS (z) = 0. There
are no credit constraints, implying that Ti (z) can be negative.
2. The supplier decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is not
accepted, then the two parties remain independent, and the producer does not re-
ceived any specific input from the supplier (in this case, the game ends with payoffs©
ONIP , O
NI
S
ª
defined below). Then, the producer and the supplier simultaneously
choose their investments, eP ≥ 0 and eS ≥ 0.
3. The supplier and the producer bargain over the division of the revenue, according
to the Nash bargaining solution given the organizational form z. Output is realized
and shared.10
The production technology of the relationship is:
F (xS, eP , eS) = φxS(peP + seS + 1) + (1− φ)(peP + 1). (2.1)
The first term in (2.1) is the output generated by the producer and the supplier con-
ditional on the supplier providing a customized (relationship-specific) input, denoted
10In this game form, the assumptions that the producer makes the organizational form offer and that
the parties receive their non-integration outside options are without loss of any generality. Moreover,
following other papers in this literature, we are using the Nash bargaining solution (see Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986, for a potential justification for Nash bargaining and a discussion of
alternative bargaining rules), but our qualitative results do not depend on Nash bargaining.
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xS = 1. If xS = 0 and this input is not supplied, these activities generate no revenue.
The value of the relationship can be further increased by the producer’s and the sup-
plier’s investments, eP and eS. The parameters p and s designate the relative importance
of investments by the producer and the supplier, that is, the extent to which one type
of investment brings more value added than the other, and φ ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to
the share of the producer’s inputs accounted for by the supplier.11 Note that φ also
determines the importance of the supplier’s investment, eS.12 This production function
has also normalized the level of output in the absence of any investments to 1, which is
without any loss of generality. The feature that there are no complementarities between
the investments of the supplier and the producer is for simplicity, and highlights the fact
that, for the results we emphasize, such complementarities are not essential.
To simplify the expressions, we assume that the supplier can provide the basic input
xS at no cost, and also that the costs of investment for both parties are quadratic:
ΓP (eP ) =
1
2
e2P and ΓS(eS) =
1
2
φe2S. (2.2)
Notice that the investment costs of the supplier are multiplied by φ. This ensures that
the costs are proportional to the scale of operation and that the socially optimal levels
of both eP and eS are independent of φ.13
In the event of disagreement, the two parties receive their outside options, which
depend on the organizational form. We denote the outside option of party i under
organizational form z by Ozi .
With backward vertical integration (V IB), the producer owns all assets, and in the
event of ex post breakup the supplier simply walks away from the firm without receiving
anything.14 The producer, who has residual control rights, keeps all the assets and the
11With competitive spot market transactions and without any specific investments, i.e., eP = eS = 0,
φ would exactly correspond to the share of costs of the producer accounted for by the supplier in
question. Although with positive investments and ex post bargaining, there will be a wedge between
the two, we refer to φ as the “share of costs” to simplify the terminology.
12Symmetrically, we could introduce another parameter, say η, to capture the importance of the
producer for the supplier. Comparative statics with respect to η are very similar to those with respect
to φ. We omit this generalization to reduce notation, and discuss empirical results regarding the effect
of a measure related to η in subsection 5.
13The socially optimal levels of investment are eP = p and eS = s. Modifying the supplier’s cost
function to ΓS(eS) = e2S/2 would introduce an implicit “scale economies”, and an increase in φ would
make the supplier’s investment more profitable (the socially optimal level of investment for the sup-
plier would become eS = sφ). Consequently, the comparative static results with respect to φ become
ambiguous.
14More generally, our analysis goes through if we assume that in case of ex post break up the supplier
receives a positive fraction of what she would receive under non-integration, and symmetrically for the
producer under forward integration.
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customized input, but lack of cooperation from the supplier causes the loss of a fraction
λ of the supplier’s investment, so the “effective investment” of the supplier is reduced
to (1 − λ)eS where λ ∈ [0, 1).15 Therefore, the outside options of the supplier and the
producer in this case are:
OV IBS (eP , eS) = 0 and O
V IB
P (eP , eS) = F (xS = 1, eP , (1− λ)eS).
With non-integration (NI), the supplier and the producer own their separate firms
and assets. In case of disagreement, the producer does not receive the customized input
from the supplier (xS = 0), and consequently, generates no output from the part of
the operations relying on those inputs. The supplier can sell her input in the market,
but suffers in this case some revenue loss because of the specificity of the input to this
producer. Therefore, the outside options under non-integration are:
ONIS (eP , eS) = θφ(seS + 1) and O
NI
P (eP , eS) = F (xS = 0, eP , eS) = (1− φ)(peP + 1),
where θ ∈ [0, 1) is an inverse measure of how much the supplier loses if she sells the
input outside of the specific relationship.16 The general equilibrium determination of θ
is beyond the scope of our paper. Here it is treated as exogenous and in the empirical
section it is proxied by the relative number of producers to suppliers (with more pro-
ducers, it might be easier for the supplier to find a suitable buyer to her input in the
secondary market).
The third organizational form is forward vertical integration (V IF ), where the sup-
plier owns all the assets. In this case, with a similar reasoning to before, the outside
options are:
OV IFS (eP , eS) = F (xS = 1, (1− λ0)eP , eS) and OV IFP (eP , eS) = 0,
where λ0 ∈ [0, 1) is the fraction of the producer’s investment the supplier loses in case of
disagreement.
Let yzi denote the output accruing to party i under organizational form z. Symmetric
Nash bargaining implies that:
yzi (eP , eS) = O
z
i (eP , eS) +
1
2
[F (xS = 1, eP , eS)−OzP (eP , eS)−OzS (eP , eS)] , (2.3)
15Alternatively, λ can be interpreted as the fraction of investment which is incurred at the end of
the period by the supplier to fine-tune the quality of the input. The supplier would not undertake this
investment in the event of disagreement.
16It is possible to also allow a secondary market in which the producer can purchase a less suitable
input, in which case his outside option would be:
ONIP (eP , eS) = (1− φ)(peP + 1) + ρφ(peP + 1),
where ρ+ θ < 1. This modification has no effect on the results.
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where the term in square brackets is the relationship-specific surplus over which bar-
gaining takes place, and is positive for all z ∈ {V IB,NI, V IF}. The important feature
is that each party’s share of revenue will be increasing in her own outside option, and
decreasing in that of the other party. This feature creates a link between outside options
and investment incentives, and through this channel, between organizational forms and
investment incentives.
Finally, the utility of party i ∈ {P, S} can be expressed as:
Uzi (yi (eP , eS) , ei) = y
z
i (eP , eS)− Γi(ei) + Ti (z) . (2.4)
2.2. Equilibrium
We next characterize the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the game specified in
the previous subsection. Unless otherwise specified, we refer to an equilibrium by the
on-the-equilibrium-path actions and revenues, (z∗, T ∗P , T
∗
S , e
∗
P , e
∗
S, y
∗
P , y
∗
S) .
It is useful to define the “total surplus” of the relationship as:
Sz = UzS (y
z
S (e
∗
P (z) , e
∗
S (z)) , e
∗
S (z)) + U
z
P (y
z
P (e
∗
P (z) , e
∗
S (z)) , e
∗
P (z)) ,
where e∗i (z) denotes party i’s optimal investment under ownership structure z. Using
equations (2.3) and (2.4) and the fact that TS (z) + TP (z) = 0 gives the total surplus of
the relationship as:
Sz = F (xS = 1, e∗P (z) , e
∗
S (z))− ΓP (e∗P (z))− ΓS(e∗S (z)). (2.5)
Since both parties have access to perfect credit markets and ex ante transfers, the
subgame perfect equilibrium will always pick the organizational form that maximizes
the surplus, S.17 In other words, Sz
∗ ≥ Sz for all z ∈ {V IB,NI, V IF}.18
We now characterize the equilibrium by calculating the levels of social surplus under
backward integration (SV IB), non-integration (SNI) and forward integration (SV IF ).
17With credit constraints, the less constrained party may become the owner even when this structure
does not maximize the ex ante social surplus, because the other party does not have the cash to
compensate the first party for giving up ownership (see, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1994a), or
Legros and Newman (2003)).
18Suppose that the equilibrium involves z∗, but Sz
∗
< Sz
0
. Then the producer, which has the
bargaining power in the first stage of the game, can propose z0 together with a compensating transfer
to the supplier, and increase its payoff. Namely, she can offer
TS (z
0) = TS (z∗) + yz
∗
S − yz
0
S − ΓS(e∗S (z∗)) + ΓS(e∗S (z0)) + ε
with ε > 0, which would be at least as attractive for the supplier, and for ε < Sz
0 −Sz∗ , also profitable
for the producer, thus yielding a contradiction.
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The equilibrium organizational form is then given by
z∗ = arg max
z∈{V IB,NI,V IF}
Sz.
Equilibrium investments are determined as the Nash equilibrium of a game where
each party chooses its investment so as to maximize utility, given the other party’s
investment and the ownership structure. More formally, the equilibrium conditional on
the ownership structure z is given by the pair {e∗S (z) , e∗P (z)} such that:
e∗P (z) = maxeP
{yzP (eP , e∗S (z))− ΓP (eP )} and e∗S (z) = maxeS {y
z
S (e
∗
P (z) , eS)− ΓS(eS)},
where the expressions for yzi (.) are given in (2.3), and those for ΓP and ΓS are given
in (2.2). The Nash equilibrium investment levels under each of the three ownership
structures can be calculated as:
e∗P (V IB) = p and e
∗
S (V IB) =
λ
2
s (2.6)
e∗P (NI) =
µ
1− φ
2
¶
p and e∗S (NI) =
1 + θ
2
s (2.7)
e∗P (V IF ) =
λ0
2
p and e∗S (V IF ) = s. (2.8)
These expressions highlight the effect of the different ownership structures on invest-
ment incentives. The investment made by the producer is highest under backward verti-
cal integration (i.e., e∗P (V IB) > e
∗
P (NI) > e
∗
P (V IF )), while that made by the supplier
is highest under forward vertical integration (i.e., e∗S (V IF ) > e
∗
S (NI) > e
∗
S (V IB)).
Most relevant for our empirical analysis ardor results that backward vertical integra-
tion increases the investment of the producer and reduces the investment of the supplier
relative to non-integration. This is a fundamental result in this class of models: backward
vertical integration reduces the supplier’s outside option and increases the share of the
surplus accruing to the producer. It therefore discourages supplier investment and en-
courages producer investment. Another important feature is that with non-integration,
the investment level of the producer is decreasing in φ, since a greater share of costs
increases the scope for holdup by the supplier. Also with non-integration, the investment
of the supplier is increasing in θ because a greater θ provides her with a better outside
market (the outside market is irrelevant for the other organizational forms, since one of
the parties has residual rights of control over the input and the assets).
Finally, substituting for e∗S (z) and e
∗
P (z) in (2.5), we obtain the total surplus un-
der the three ownership structures, SV IB, SNI , and SV IF , and the comparison of the
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surpluses gives the following proposition (the relevant expressions and the proof are
provided in Appendix A):
Proposition 1. There exist r, r, and br such that the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium ownership structure, z∗, is given as follows:
• If r < r, then z∗ = V IB for p/s > r, z∗ = NI for p/s ∈ (r, r), and z∗ = V IF for
p/s < r. Moreover,
∂r
∂φ
< 0,
∂r
∂φ
> 0,
∂r
∂θ
> 0 and
∂r
∂θ
< 0.
• If r ≥ r, then z∗ = V IB for p/s > br, and z∗ = V IF for p/s < br. Moreover,
∂br
∂φ
> 0 and
∂br
∂θ
= 0.
Proposition 1 summarizes the most important comparative static results that will
be empirically investigated in the second part of the paper. Since the empirical analysis
will focus on the margin between backward integration and non-integration, we assume
henceforth that r < r and restrict the discussion of the comparative statics to this
margin.
First, the proposition implies that, given the other parameters, the choice of orga-
nizational form depends on p and s. When p is high, or s is low, backward integration
is the equilibrium organizational form. Non-integration emerges when p is low or s is
high. Intuitively, backward integration becomes more likely when p is large because, in
this case, the tasks in which the producer specializes are highly “technology intensive”
(i.e., the producer’ activity brings more value added), so increasing the producer’s in-
vestment is the first priority. Backward vertical integration achieves this by increasing
the producer’s outside option and reducing that of the supplier. In contrast, when s is
large, backward integration becomes less likely, since the investment of the supplier is
now more important, and by reducing the supplier’s outside option backward integration
discourages her investment.
Second, an increase in φ makes backward integration more likely relative to non-
integration. A greater share of costs (of the supplier’s inputs in the producer’s total costs)
increases the degree to which the producer will be held up by the supplier. Backward
vertical integration becomes more preferable because it avoids this problem. In addition,
this result also implies that there are important interaction effects: the positive effect
of p/s on backward vertical integration is amplified by φ. To see this let us focus of the
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comparison between non-integration and backward integration, and denote the surplus
difference between these two organizational forms by ∆B ≡ SV IB − SNI . Then we have
that:
∂2∆B
∂φ∂p
> 0 and
∂2∆B
∂φ∂s
< 0.
This prediction is also quite intuitive. It suggests that when the relationship between
the producer and the supplier is less important, their respective technology intensities
should have less effect on integration decisions.
Finally, a greater θ makes non-integration more likely relative to backward vertical
integration; with a greater θ, the supplier invests more under non-integration because
she has a better outside option, and this makes non-integration a more desirable orga-
nizational form. If we interpret θ as the degree of competition in the market, this result
would imply that, consistent with some of the claims made in the popular press, greater
competition encourages non-integration over both backward and forward integration.
However, a more appropriate interpretation might be that θ is a function of the ratio
of producers to suppliers in the market since, with a larger number of producers, the
supplier is more likely to find a suitable match in the secondary market after a breakup.
In this case, an increase in competition, associated with an increase in the numbers of
both suppliers and producers, need not increase non-integration.
2.3. Summary and Empirical Hypotheses
We can summarize the most important empirical hypotheses from our framework as
follows.
1. Technology intensities of the producer and the supplier should have opposite effects
on the likelihood of vertical integration.
2. These effects should be amplified when the supplier accounts for a larger fraction
of the input costs of the producer.
3. Focusing on backward vertical integration, greater technology intensity of the pro-
ducer, lower technology intensity of the supplier, and greater share of costs of the
producer accounted by inputs from the supplier should make vertical integration
more likely.
4. Finally, again focusing on backward vertical integration, we may also expect the
number of producing firms relative to supplying firms to encourage non-integration.
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In light of these empirical hypothesis, we next investigate the potential determinants
of vertical integration.
3. Data and Measurement
3.1. Vertical Integration
Central to our empirical strategy is a measure of vertical integration. As discussed in
the Introduction, to compute such a measure we need to organize the data in a specific
way. Motivated by the previous literature, we look at the data from the viewpoint of the
producing firm and ask whether for each potential supplying industry that producer is
vertically integrated or not. This conceptual exercise amounts to constructing a measure
proxying for backward vertical integration (even though since we do not observe which
firm/manager has residual rights of control, this is not identical to backward vertical
integration in the theory).
More precisely, for each firm i = 1, 2, .., N , our first measure is a dummy for whether,
for each product (industry) j = 1, 2, .., J it is producing, the firm owns a plant in industry
k = 1, 2, ..,K supplying product j:
viijk =
½
0
1
if the firm does not own a plant in industry k supplying industry j
if the firm owns at least one plant in industry k supplying industry j
.
(3.1)
This measure provides a direct answer to the question of whether each producing firm
can supply some of its own input k necessary for the production of product j. However,
it does not use any information on how much the firm produces in its own plants.
We also construct an alternative (continuous) measure using this information. Let
cij denote the total cost (including intermediate, capital and labor costs) of firm i in
producing j, and wjk denote the proportion of total costs of producing j that are made up
of input k, which is obtained from the UK Input-Output Table. We can think of cijwjk
as the firm’s demand for input k for product j (to obtain the firm’s total demand for k
we sum over j). Let yik denote the amount of k that firm i produces. The alternative
measure of the degree of vertical integration of firm i in the industry pair jk is calculated
as:19
viijk = min
½
yik
cijwjk
, 1
¾
. (3.2)
When a firm produces several different products that demand input k, and where the
total demand is greater than what can be supplied by the firm itself, we assume that it
19Davies and Morris (1995) construct a related index with more aggregate data, while Fan and Lang
(2000) measure corporate relatedness using a similar measure.
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allocates the input across plants proportionately to their demand, so that the measure
becomes
viijk = min
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
yikP
j
cijwjk
, 1
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
. (3.3)
In practice, there is little difference between viijk and viijk, because when a firm owns a
plant in a supplying industry, it is typically sufficient to cover all of its input requirements
from that industry. So for most of our analysis, we focus on the viijk measure.
Our main source of data is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD).20 This is
collected by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and firms have a legal obligation
to reply. These data provide us with information on input costs and output for each
production plant located in the UK at the 4-digit industry level and on the ownership
structure of these plants.21 These data do not, however, tell us directly whether a
plant purchases inputs from a related plant in the same firm. Data on the demand for
intermediate inputs are available at the 2/3-digit industry level from the Input-Output
Domestic Use Table. The Input-Output Table contains information on domestic input
flows between 77 manufacturing industries, giving 5,929 pairs of producing-supplying
industries, 3,840 of which have positive flows. Appendix Table A.1 lists all 77 (supplying)
industries together with their largest purchaser and other information.
Because of the level of aggregation of the Input-Output Table, one difficulty arises
when we look at industry pairs where the input and output are in the same 2/3-digit
industry. In this case, we consider a firm to be vertically integrated only if it has plants
in more than one of the 4-digit industries within that 2/3-digit industry. Further details
on the construction of these measures are provided in Appendix B.
We should emphasize again that all of the measures here are conceptually similar to
backward vertical integration. In particular, we are measuring the probability that a
producer is vertically integrated with each potential supplier (rather than the probability
that a supplier is vertically integrated with each potential producer).
20This dataset is constructed using the data from the Annual Business Inquiry from 1998 and onward.
Before that the name of the Inquiry was The Annual Census of Production (ACOP). See Griffith (1999)
and Barnes and Martin (2002) for a description of these data.
21Data on employment is available for all plants. Data on other inputs and output are available at the
establishment level. An establishment is often a single plant, but can also be a group of plants owned
by the same firm that operate in the same 4-digit industry. We have input and output data on all
establishments with over one hundred employees, data from smaller establishments are collected from
a random stratified sample and values for non-sampled plants are imputed. Throughout, we exclude
single plant firms with fewer than twenty employees.
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3.2. Technology Intensity and the Share of Costs
Our main measure of technology intensity is R&D intensity, but we also report robustness
results using investment intensity. Both these measures are at the industry level rather
than at the firm level for two reasons: first, our methodology focuses on the technology of
an industry, not on whether a specific firm is more R&D or investment intensive; second,
we need measures that apply both to integrated and non-integrated relationships, which
naturally takes us to the industry level.
R&D intensity is measured as R&D expenditure divided by total value added.22 We
use R&D data pre-dating the vertical integration sample (1994-1995). The total value
added in the denominator includes all firms in the industry (both those performing R&D
and those that do not).
R&D intensity is our preferred measure since it is directly related to investment in
new technologies. A possible concern is that the distribution of R&D across industries
is rather skewed. Another concern might be that R&D could be spuriously correlated
with vertical integration; for example, because it is better reported in industries with
many large firms and large firms are more likely to be vertically integrated (though, in
many specifications, we also control for firm size).
For these reasons, we consider an alternative indicator of industry technology by
looking at physical investment intensity. This information is reported at the level of the
firm’s line of business and can be directly linked to the producing or supplying part of
vertically integrated firms. It is also more widely reported and less skewed both within
and between industries. As with R&D data, we use data pre-dating the measure of
vertical integration, 1992-95, and aggregate the data from the firm’s line of business to
the industry level. The disadvantage of this measure relative to R&D intensity is that
physical investment intensity may be less related to technology and may also have a
more limited firm-specific component, which is important for the model we have used to
motivate our empirical analysis.
The share of costs between each industry pair jk, scjk, is calculated from the Input-
Output table as the share of inputs from industry k in the total cost of industry j (£ of
input k necessary to produce £1 of product j).
22We have data on R&D and value-added at the firm—industry level. We use these data to construct
R&D and value-added by summing over all firm-industry observations in each industry. In the UK these
data on R&D are reported separated both by the industry of the firm conducting the R&D and the
product category for which the R&D is intended. This enables us to have a more accurate measurement
of R&D by producing and supplying industries.
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and also for subsamples sep-
arated according to whether the producer (supplier) has a high or low R&D intensity.
There are 3,840 industry pairs where the Input-Output table indicates that transactions
occur. There are 46,392 manufacturing firms with twenty or more employees operating
in the UK at some time over the period 1996-2001. Since individual firms seldom change
their organization structure over this short time period we collapse the data into a single
cross-section. An observation in our data represents a firm i producing product j which
uses input k; this gives us 2,973,008 observations at the firm-industry pair level.
The first row of Table 1 gives the mean and standard deviation of the continuous
measure of vertical integration, viijk. The mean is 0.008 with a standard deviation of
0.087, which shows that there is substantial variation across firms and at the sub-firm
level. There is also substantial variation within industry pairs. To illustrate this, we
calculate the average within-industry-pair standard deviation of viijk, which is 0.086 (not
shown in the table). This indicates that, even within a relatively narrow industry-pair,
there is as much variation in the extent of vertical integration as in the whole sample.
The low mean of this variable is driven by the large number of zeros. The mean
of viijk conditional on viijk > 0 (not shown) is 0.93. This indicates that if a firm
can produce some of its inputs k in-house, it can typically produce all that input (k)
necessary for production.23 This motivates our focus on the simpler dummy variable
viijk, which indicates whether the firm owns a plant producing input k which it needs in
the production of the product j (see equation (3.1)). Not surprisingly, the second row
shows that the mean of this variable, 0.009, is very similar to that of viijk.
The other columns illustrate the differences in the extent of vertical integration when
we separate firm-industry pairs by producer R&D intensity and supplier R&D intensity.
These differences, which will be investigated in greater detail in the regression analysis
below, indicate that vertical integration is higher when the R&D intensity of the produc-
ing industry is high. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics do not show any difference
between vertical integration when we cut the sample by whether the R&D intensity of
the supplying industry is high or low.24 The regression analysis below will show a nega-
23Naturally this does not imply that if a firm is vertically integrated for one of its inputs, it is also
vertically integrated for its other inputs. In fact, the mean of
P
k wjkviijk conditional on viijk0 > 0 for
some k0 is 0.053, so on average, across firms that are vertically integrated in any one input, firms are
vertically integrated in around 5% of their total inputs demanded.
24When we group firms on the basis of investment intensity, we see that greater supplier investment
intensity is associated with lower vertical integration. This cut of the data is not shown in Table 1 to
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tive effect of supplier R&D intensity as well as supplier investment intensity on vertical
integration, but due to nonlinearities in this relationship (see also Appendix Table A.3),
the high-low cut does not show this result.
R&D intensity is positively correlated with investment intensity, although the cor-
relation is quite low (0.251). The relatively weak correlation between these measures
means that each measure is an imperfect proxy for the overall technology intensity of the
sector, and consequently, there might be some attenuation bias in our estimates of the
relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration. It also suggests that
these measures capture different dimensions of technology intensity, so that it is useful
to study the relationship between each of them and vertical integration separately.
The table also shows the means and standard deviations of the other main covariates,
defined in Appendix B.
4. Results
4.1. Benchmark Specification
Table 2 reports the main results. It reports estimates from the following linear proba-
bility model:
viijk = αscjk + βPRD
P
j + βSRD
S
k +X
0
ijkη + εijk, (4.1)
where scjk is the share of costs, RDPj is R&D intensity in the producing industry j, RD
S
k
is R&D intensity in the supplying industry k, Xijk is a vector including the constant term
and firm and industry characteristics (firm size and age, average firm size and age in
producing and supplying industries). The main coefficients of interest are α, βP and βS.
The regressions are at the firm industry-pair level, while some of the main regressors are
at the (producing or supplying) industry level. For this reason, throughout all standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the industry pair level.25
The first two columns of Table 2 consider the bivariate relationship between R&D
intensity in the producing and supplying industries and vertical integration. Column 1
shows a positive and highly statistically significant relationship between R&D intensity
save space.
25There is also a potential correlation between observations for the same firm in different industry
pairs. Unfortunately, we were unable to estimate a variance-covariance matrix with multiple random
effects or multiple levels of clustering, due the large size of the dataset. Nevertheless, we believe that
the downward bias in the standard errors should be small in our case, since, as noted in footnote 23,
the probability of a firm that is vertically integrated for one of her inputs also being integrated for
other inputs is relatively small. In any case, in Table 4, we estimate these models including a full set of
firm fixed effects (for those firms that operate in more than one industry), which directly removes any
potential correlation across firm observations.
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in the producing industry and vertical integration. The estimate of βP is 0.038 with a
standard error of 0.006. Column 2 shows a negative and highly statistically significant
relationship between R&D intensity in the supplying industry and vertical integration;
the estimate of βS is -0.010 (standard error of 0.002). These relationships are robust to
the inclusion of other covariates in the rest of the table.
The third column includes both R&D intensity variables and the share of costs. The
R&D intensity variables continue to be highly statistically significant, with coefficients
close to those in columns 1 and 2 (0.040 and -0.007), while the share of costs is posi-
tive and also statistically significant. The pattern of opposite signs on R&D intensity
of producing and supplying industries is consistent with our first empirical hypothesis
discussed in subsection 2.3.
Moreover, the directions of the effects of R&D intensities and the share of costs are
in line with our third empirical hypothesis, that is, they are consistent with the theory
provided that the relevant choice in the data is between backward vertical integration
and non-integration. This is reassuring, since we not only believe that this is the case
(based on the bulk of evidence in the prior literature) but also because, as explained
above, we organized the data to have measure conceptually corresponding to backward
vertical integration.
Our second empirical hypothesis from subsection 2.3 suggests the possibility of in-
teraction effects between the share of costs and R&D intensity. To investigate this issue,
we modify our estimating equation to
viijk = αscjk + (βP + γPscjk)RD
P
j + (βS + γSscjk)RD
S
k +X
0
ijkη + εijk, (4.2)
with γP and γS as the additional coefficients of interest. Theory suggests that γP should
have the same sign as βP , and that γS should have the same sign as βP , so that the effects
of R&D intensity in producing and supplying industries should be amplified when there
is a greater share of costs. Throughout, when including interaction terms, we report the
main effects evaluated at the sample mean, so that these estimates are comparable to
those in the models without interaction effects.
The estimates in column 4 are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The main
effects are close to those in the previous columns, and the interaction effects are large
and statistically significant: γP is positive (1.112 with a standard error of 0.402), while
γS is negative (-0.909 with a standard error of 0.353).
Columns 5 and 6 add a number of characteristics at the firm-line of business and
industry level, namely firm size and age (in that line of business), and average firm
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size and average firm age in producing and supplying industries. All five coefficients of
interest are robust, and remain close to their baseline values (the only minor exception is
βP , which declines from 0.040 in column 3 to 0.030 in column 6). The coefficients on the
controls are also interesting. They indicate, for example, that larger and older firms are
more likely to be vertically integrated, which is plausible. Furthermore, greater average
firm size in the producing industry makes vertical integration more likely, while average
firm size in the supplying industry appears to reduce the probability of integration.
This opposite pattern of coefficients, with firm size in the producing industry having
a positive effect, is also consistent with our conjecture that the relevant margin in the
data is backward integration.
Overall, the results in Table 2 show an interesting pattern of opposite-signed effects
from technology intensity in producing and supplying industries (which is consistent
with our first empirical hypothesis in subsection 2.3). They also show that these effects
are magnified when the share of costs accounted for by the supplying industry in the
total costs of the producing industry is large (which is consistent with our second em-
pirical hypothesis). In addition, the direction of the effects is also consistent with are
measurement strategy and the theory provided that the relevant margin in the data is
backward vertical integration (our third empirical hypothesis).
Before further investigating the robustness of our findings, it is useful to discuss
the economic magnitudes of the estimates in Table 2. The implied magnitude of the
main effects is very small. For example, the coefficient of -0.013 in column 4 of Table 2
suggests that a one standard deviation (0.107) increase in the R&D intensity of supplying
industry reduces the probability of vertical integration by slightly more than 0.1% (-
0.013×0.107≈-0.001). However, this small effect applies at the mean of the distribution
of share of costs, which is 0.010. If, instead, we evaluate the effect at the 90th percentile
of the share of cost distribution, which is about 0.20, then the overall effect is much larger;
again using the numbers from column 4, a one standard deviation increase in supplier
R&D intensity leads to almost a 2% decrease in the probability of vertical integration
(-0.001+(-0.909×0.19×0.107)≈0.02). Similarly, the impact of producer R&D intensity is
small when evaluated at the mean, about 0.2%, (0.037×0.055≈0.002), but sizable, 1.4%,
when evaluated at higher levels of share of costs (0.002+(1.104×0.19×0.055)≈0.014).
This pattern is in fact quite sensible. For the vast majority of industry pairs, the
scale of the relationship between the producer and the supplier is so small that it would
be surprising if technology intensity were of any great importance for integration deci-
sions. Our theory should instead be relevant for industry pairs where the scale of the
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relationship (as measured by the share of costs) is large, and this is exactly where we see
a significant positive effect of the R&D intensity of producing industries and a significant
negative effect of the R&D intensity of supplying industries. This discussion also implies
that the interaction effects are as important as are the main effects for the relevance of
the pattern documented here.
4.2. Within Firm Variation
A more demanding test of the relationship between technology intensity and vertical
integration is to investigate whether a particular firm is more likely to be vertically
integrated in producing industries that are more technologically intensive and with sup-
plying industries that are less technology intensive. This is done by estimating a model
including firm fixed effects.
Naturally, this can only be investigate using multiplant firms, i.e., those that produce
in more than one industry, which introduces a potential selection bias. At some level, this
is mechanical; vertically integrated firms have to be multiplant firms. More generally,
producer and supplier technology intensity may affect the likelihood of being a multiplant
firm differentially, and if so, regressions on the subsample of multiplant firms may lead
to biased estimates of the effect of technology (R&D) intensity on vertical integration.
In Table 3, we investigate both the robustness of our results to the inclusion of firm
fixed effects and potential selection issues.
Column 1 reports our basic specification (without fixed effects) on multiplant firms
only. Comparing this to column 4 of Table 2, a number of features are noteworthy.
First, the number of observations is now 891,942 rather than 2,973,008 as in Table 2.
Second, despite changes in coefficient estimates, the overall pattern is quite similar. In
particular, there is a positive effect of producer R&D intensity and a negative effect
of supplier R&D intensity on vertical integration. Both these effects are larger than
those in Table 2. The interaction effects also have the expected signs. This pattern of
results is reassuring, since it shows that our main results in Table 2 were not driven by
the contrast of single to multiplant firms. Within multiplant firms, those with greater
producer R&D intensity are also more likely to be vertically integrated, while those with
greater supplier R&D intensity are less likely to be vertically integrated.
Column 2 adds a full set of firm fixed effects to the specification in column 1. This
has surprisingly little effect on the results. The coefficients on the share of cost, the
interaction between producer R&D intensity and share of cost, supplier R&D intensity
and the interaction between share of costs and supplier R&D intensity are essentially
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identical to those in column 1. The only change is in the main effect of producer R&D
intensity, which falls from 0.073 to 0.024 and is no longer statistically significant.
However, it is important to emphasize that even though producer R&D intensity
is insignificant when evaluated at the mean, the overall pattern is not very different;
due to the significant interaction effect, producing industries with substantial R&D
intensity are much more likely to vertically integrate activities that are important for
their products. In fact, since the interaction effect is larger than in Table 2, the effect of a
one standard deviation increase in producer R&D intensity on the probability of vertical
integration for a pair at the 90th percentile of the share of costs distribution is now
greater than in Table 2 at 3% (0.03×0.055+(2.741×0.19×0.055)≈0.030), rather than
1.4% when using the estimates from column 5 of Table 2. Similarly, now a one standard
deviation increase in supplier R&D intensity has a larger effect, 5% (-0.016×0.107+(-
2.482×0.19×0.107)≈0.052), rather than 2% when using the estimate from column 5 of
Table 2.
Column 3 repeats the model of column 2 including the full set of covariates. The
results are similar to those in column 2, except that the coefficients on the level of
producer and supplier R&D decline.
These specifications do not deal with the potential selection problem. In columns 4
and 5 we estimate a standard Heckman selection model. Column 4 shows estimates from
the probit model of the probability of a firm being a multiproduct firm as a function of
the full set of variables used to explain vertical integration. Among the main variables
of interest, only the R&D intensity of the producing industry turns out to have an effect
on the probability of a firm of being multiproduct, whereas the share of costs, R&D
intensity of the supplying industry and the interaction of producer and supplier R&D
intensities with the share of costs appear to have no influence on multiplant status. This
implies that the R&D intensity of the producing industry is most likely to suffer from a
bias due to endogenous selection (interestingly, this is the only coefficient for which the
estimate changed substantially after the introduction of firm fixed effects).
Column 5 shows the second stage of whether a firm is vertically integrated, con-
ditional on being a multiplant firm. The second-stage equation excludes the firm and
industry characteristics.26 Given the pattern in column 4, it is not surprising that the
26This implies that the selection results have to be interpreted with caution, since there are various
natural reasons for why firm and industry characteristics may need to be in the second stage. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have any natural exclusion restrictions. We attempted to estimate the selection model
using only functional form restrictions, however, as is commonly the case in such models, we were not
able to obtain sensible estimates due to the high degree of collinearity between the variables.
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most remarkable change occurs in the main effect of the producer R&D intensity which
is now larger (0.030) and statistically significant (standard error 0.012). The main effect
of the supplier R&D becomes smaller (in absolute value), but remains highly significant.
In summary, Table 3 subjects our basic specification to a more demanding test by
including a full set of firm fixed effects. These fixed effects control for various unobserved
firm characteristics which may be potentially correlated with the propensity to become
integrated. These specifications still show a negative effect of supplier R&D, and a pos-
itive (sometimes significant and sometimes insignificant) effect of producer R&D. Most
importantly, all of these specifications show large, statistically significant and opposite-
signed interaction effects between producer and supplier R&D intensities and the share
of costs.
4.3. An Instrumental Variables Strategy
So far, the results point to statistically significant associations between vertical integra-
tion and the technology intensity in the producing and supplying industries. However,
these associations do not necessarily correspond to the causal effects of the technology
intensity variables on vertical integration decisions. First, as highlighted by the above
theory, vertical integration also affects investment in technology, so that there is scope
for reverse causality. Second, there may be other variables that are omitted from the
regressions, which have a causal effect on both technology intensity and vertical inte-
gration. This will mean that the error term is correlated with the regressors and will
lead to biased estimates of the coefficients of interest. To the extent that the omitted
variables are at the firm level, this is controlled for by the within-firm estimates shown
above, but there may still be omitted variables at the firm-industry level affecting the
estimates.
A more satisfactory approach would be to use an instrumental variable strategy,
with instruments that affect technology intensity, without influencing vertical integra-
tion through other channels (i.e., they should be orthogonal to the error term, εijk, in
equations (4.1) and (4.2)). Although we do not have such perfect instruments, measures
of technology intensity in the same industry in the U.S. are potential candidates. These
instruments are useful in avoiding the potential reverse causality problems and in re-
moving the effect of UK-specific omitted variables, although this procedure would not
help with omitted industry-specific variables that are common across the U.S. and the
UK. Therefore, these results should not necessarily be interpreted as causal estimates,
but as estimates investigating a different source of variation in the data.
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Since we do not have U.S. data on R&D intensity at the same level of disaggregation,
we use the investment intensity of the corresponding supplying and producing sector in
the United States (at the same 2/3-digit industry) as instrument for R&D intensity. The
first-stage equations for the model in (4.1) are:
RDPj = π
P
1 scjk + Z
0πP2 +X
0
ijkη
P + uPijk (4.3)
RDSk = π
S
1 scjk + Z
0πS2 +X
0
ijkη
S + uSijk,
where the Zj’s is the vector of instruments for technology intensity in the supplying
and producing industries (in other words, investment intensity in the supplying and
producing industries in the U.S.), while πP2 and π
S
2 are vectors of parameters.
In column 1 of Table 4, we start with instrumental variables (IV) estimates of equa-
tion (4.1). The top panel shows the second-stage results, while the bottom panels report
the first-stage coefficients from (4.3) as well as the R2 and the p-value of the F-statistics
for the significance of the instruments in the first stage. The first-stage relationships are
highly significant, and show a very appealing pattern: producer investment technology
intensity in the U.S. is correlated with producer R&D intensity in the UK, but not with
the supplier technology intensity in the UK. The pattern is similar (i.e., the coefficients
are reversed) for supplier technology intensity in the U.S.. This gives us confidence that
the IV estimates are capturing a useful source of variation.
The second stage estimates in column 1 are interesting: the producer R&D intensity
is positive and supplier R&D intensity is negative. Both estimates are highly signifi-
cant and much larger than the OLS estimates. The larger IV estimates for the main
effects of the technology intensity variables likely reflects the fact that the IV procedure
is reducing the attenuation bias in the OLS estimates resulting from classical measure-
ment error. This type of attenuation bias might be quite important here, since our
measures of technology (R&D) intensity are highly imperfect proxies for the importance
of relationship-specific technology investments. Another possible interpretation is that,
consistent with the significant interactions between technology intensity and the share
of costs, which show heterogeneous effects conditional on observables, there are also
heterogeneous effects conditional on unobservables. In that case, because OLS and IV
have different weighting functions, it is natural that they will lead to different estimates
(see Angrist and Imbens, 1995). In any case, we interpret these results as supportive of
the main prediction of our theory.
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For the model in (4.2), we have four first-stage equations, which are
RDPj = π
P
1 scjk + Z
0πP2 + (Z
0scjk)πP3 +X
0
ijkη
P + uPijk
RDPj scjk = π
PC
1 scjk + Z
0πPC2 + (Z
0scjk)πPC3 +X
0
ijkη
PC + uPCijk
RDSj = π
S
1 scjk + Z
0πS2 + (Z
0scjk)πS3 +X
0
ijkη
S + uSijk
RDSj scjk = π
SC
1 scjk + Z
0πSC2 + (Z
0scjk) πS3 +X
0
ijkη
SC + uSCijk ,
where, for example, RDPj scjk is the interaction between producer R&D intensity and
share of cost, and Z 0scjk denotes the interaction between the vector of instruments and
the share of cost.
In columns (2) to (4) of Table 4 we report IV estimates based on these (to save
space, in the bottom panel we report only the two first-stage equations for the main
effects).27 While the instrumental variable strategy works reasonably well for the main
effects, instrumenting for the interaction effects is more challenging, since instruments
constructed by interacting the original instruments with the share of costs are highly
correlated with the instruments for the main effects. In column 2, we report estimates
where both main effects and interaction terms are instrumented. The main effect esti-
mates are similar to those in column 1, but the interaction estimates are quite large and
imprecisely estimated (though still statistically significant). This reflects the difficulty of
simultaneously instrumenting for main effects and interaction effects that are mechani-
cally correlated.28 In column 3, we add our usual set of covariates to this specification.
Now the multicolinearity issue becomes worse and the main effect of producer R&D in-
tensity turns negative, while the interaction terms are even larger and more imprecisely
estimated. Finally, in column 4, we add fixed effects. Interestingly, in this case, the
estimates are more similar to those in column 2.
Overall, the IV estimates using the U.S. values as instruments for UK producer and
supplier R&D intensity are mixed. When we only instrument the main effects, the
results confirm the overall picture emerging from the OLS regressions. When we also
instrument the interaction terms, there is too much multicolinearity to learn much from
the estimates.
27Given the size of the data set, all IV estimates are implemented using the "control function"
approach, which involves including the residuals from the first stages as additional regressors in the
second stage (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 18).
28As an additional experiment, we used only the control functions from the two levels equations,
which essentially amounts to only instrumenting for the main effects. This yields results that are much
more favorable to our hypothesis and similar to the OLS. For example, the coeffiecient estimates for the
main effects and interactions of producer and supplier R&D in the equivalent specification to column 2
are, respectively, 0.509 (s.e=0.061), 1.126 (s.e=0.401), -0.164 (s.e=0.015), and -0.958 (s.e=0.352).
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5. Robustness
In this section we consider a number of robustness checks. First, we investigate whether
the use of a linear probability models versus a probit model matters for the results. Sec-
ond, we report results using our alternative measure of technology intensity, which uses
information on physical investment. Finally, we consider a number of other robustness
checks. In the Appendix, we also check the robustness of our main results in various
subsamples and investigate the role of nonlinearities.29
5.1. Probit Estimates versus Linear Probability Models
Tables 2-4 use linear probability models. These have a number of attractive features,
including being easier to interpret and estimate (for example, with large samples and
individual fixed effects). Nevertheless, it is important to investigate whether alternative
estimation strategies lead to similar results. This issue is addressed in Table 5.
Specifically, Table 5 compares estimates from the linear probability model and the
probit model. Column 1 repeats column 3 from Table 2. Column 2 reports marginal
effects from a probit model evaluated at the mean value of all right-hand side variables.
Column 3 reports the mean, minimum and maximum values of the marginal effects (from
the same probit model as in column 2). Columns 4 to 6 repeat this for the specification
shown in column 4 of Table 2 and columns 7 to 9 for the specification shown in column
6 of Table 2. The marginal effects of the interaction terms are calculated using the
formulae given by Ai and Norton (2003).
These results show that, on the whole, our main results are not sensitive to the choice
of functional form. With probit, the main effect for producer R&D intensity is somewhat
smaller, but similar and statistically significant (e.g., compare column 2 to column 1).
For the interaction effects, the probit results are substantially smaller when the marginal
effects are evaluated at the mean. However, more interesting is the mean of the marginal
effects, reported in columns 6 and 9; here, the interaction effects are larger, though still
smaller than the linear probability models. These columns also show that the range of
estimates includes much larger interaction effects. Therefore, our interpretation of the
29We also investigated the stability of the basic relationship between technology intensity and vertical
integration over years, and the results are stable across years (details available upon request). In
addition, we estimated specifications controlling for the share of the output of the supplying industry
going to the producing industry in question. When entered by itself, this variable is significant with the
expected sign, but when entered together with the share of cost, it is no longer significant and typically
has the opposite of the sign predicted by our model (the results are available upon request, and see also
footnote 12 above).
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somewhat smaller interaction effects in the probit estimation is that the nonlinearity in
the probit specification is giving us information about a different part of the distribution
of heterogeneous effects.
Overall, despite some differences in magnitudes, these results are generally supportive
of the patterns shown in Tables 2-4.
5.2. Results with Investment Intensity
Our alternative measure of technology intensity uses information on physical investments
instead of R&D. Even though greater physical investment need not be associated with
more specific investments, we expect firms making more investments overall to also un-
dertake greater investments in technology and relationship-specific assets. In this light,
it would be reassuring if the results were similar when using the investment intensity
measure of technology.
Table 6 repeats the benchmark regressions of Table 2 using our alternative measure
of technology intensity. Overall, the results point to a similar pattern: investment in-
tensity in the producing industry is positively associated with vertical integration, while
investment intensity in the supplying industry is negatively associated with integra-
tion. For example, column 3 shows a coefficient of 0.030 (standard error =0.006) on
producer technology intensity, while the coefficient on supplier technology intensity is
-0.046 (standard error =0.004).
The exception to this pattern is for producer investment intensity when the full set
of additional covariates are included. In this case producer technology intensity is no
longer statistically significant. Nevertheless, there continues to be a positive, significant,
and large effect of the interaction between producer investment intensity and the share of
costs. Consequently, producer technology intensity has no effect on vertical integration
when evaluated at the mean share of cost, but has a substantial effect when the share
of cost is large (e.g. at the 90th percentile). Supplier technology intensity continues to
be highly significant, both at the mean and for large shares of costs.30
5.3. Other Robustness Checks
The rest of the robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.
30We also repeated our other robustness checks using investment intensity. The results are generally
similar to those with R&D intensity. For example with firm fixed effects, producer investment intensity
loses significance when we include fixed effects, but once we control for selection as in column 5 of Table
3, we recover an estimate very similar to that in Table 6. Similarly, instrumental variable estimates
show a similar pattern to those with R&D intensity. These results are available upon request.
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Appendix Table A.2 reports estimates from the specification including all the covari-
ates as in column 6 of Table 2 for two subsamples for (we do not report the coefficients
on the covariates to save space). In the first column, we show the results excluding the
bottom quartile of firms by size, in the second column we exclude the top quartile by
size. These models are useful to check whether our results are driven by the comparison
of large to small firms. The results hold up in these subsamples.
In column 3, we use our alternative measure of vertical integration, viijk. The results
are very similar to those using the vertical integration dummy, viijk. In particular,
producer R&D intensity has a positive and significant effect on vertical integration while
supplier R&D intensity has a negative effect. The interaction effects are significant and
have opposite signs as in our baseline estimates.
Finally, Appendix Table A.3 considers potential nonlinearities. It reports results
with dummies for share of cost, and a producing (or supplying) industry being at the
second, third or fourth quartile of the corresponding distribution (with the first quartile
as the omitted group). The results show that there is generally a monotonic pattern,
consistent with the linear regressions reported in previous tables, with the exception of
the effect of R&D intensity in the supplying industry. Here the second quartile has the
largest negative effect, while the third quartile has a small, and sometimes insignificant,
sometimes positive effect. This nonlinear pattern, for which we do not have a good
explanation, is the reason why the difference in vertical integration by the R&D intensity
of the suppliers was not visible in the descriptive statistics in Table 1.
6. Outside Options and Competition
Finally, we now briefly look at the fourth empirical hypothesis suggested by our model,
which concerns potential links between competition and vertical integration (recall sub-
section 2.3). In Table 7, we briefly investigate this relationship using the number of firms
in producing and supplying industries as our main indicator of competition. The table
shows that a greater number of firms in the producing industry is associated with lower
vertical integration, while a greater number of firms in the supplying industry leads to
more vertical integration. When we include fixed effects (columns 2 and 4), the effect
of the number of firms in the producing industry is no longer significant, but the effect
of the number of firms in the supplying industry remains significant and of a similar
magnitude to the estimate without fixed effects.
It is also noteworthy that the coefficient on the number of firms in the supplying
industry is about four times the magnitude of the coefficient for the number of firms in
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the producing industry. Ignoring this difference in magnitude, for which we do not have
any good explanation, these results are consistent with the theory, where we showed
that, as long as the relevant margin is backward integration, a greater θ, which increases
the outside option of the supplier, should make vertical integration less likely. A greater
number of firms in the producing industry is likely to increase the supplier’s outside
option, while more firms in the supplying industry should reduce it. This is the pattern
we find in the data.31
Interestingly, if we think of an increase in overall competition as corresponding to a
proportional increase in the number of producing and supplying firms, since the coeffi-
cient on the number of supplying firms is larger, our estimates suggest that there should
be an increase in vertical integration. Although this result is not our main focus, it
sheds some doubt on the popular claims that greater (global or national) competition is
necessarily leading to less integrated firms.
7. Summary and Conclusions
Despite a number of well-established theories and a prominent public debate on the
effect of technology and technical change on the internal organization of the firm, there
is little evidence on the determinants of vertical integration. This paper proposes a
new approach to investigate the predictions of the PRT approach of Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). This approach relies on comparing vertical
integration patterns across pairs of industries (products). We use data from the entire
population of UKmanufacturing plants, and document a number of empirical regularities
in the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration.
Our results show that vertical integration in a pair of industries is less likely when
the supplying industry is more technology intensive and the producing industry is less
technology intensive. Moreover, both these effects are larger when inputs from the sup-
plying industry constitute a large fraction of the total costs of the producing industry.
This pattern of opposite effects of technology intensity of producing and supplying in-
dustries is consistent with the PRT approach. In addition, the direction of these effects,
for example, that vertical integration is more likely when the producing industry is
more technology intensive, and the other patterns we document, are consistent with the
31We also experimented with Hirfindahl indices for producing and supplying industries. Although
the Hirfindahl indices were sometimes significant, the results were not robust. The addition of the
Hirfindahl indices did not change the effects of the number of firms in the producing and supplying
industries on vertical integration, however. Also, these results are robust to using physical investments
instead of R&D as a measure of technology intensity.
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theory, provided that the relevant margin in the data is the choice between backward
vertical integration and non-integration.
We report similar results controlling for firm fixed effects and instrumenting UK
technology intensity measures with U.S. measures. We also show the robustness of our
results to a variety of other specifications.
Finally, we find that vertical integration is more likely when the average number
of producing firms is greater relative to the average number of supplying firms, which
is also consistent with the theoretical predictions we derived from a simple incomplete
contracts model (and not entirely consistent with the claims made in the popular press
about the effect of competition on the structure of firms).
The results in this paper provide a number of empirical patterns that may be useful
for theories of vertical integration to confront. Although our empirical investigation is
motivated by a specific theoretical approach, the PRT, the empirical patterns we docu-
ment should be of more general interest and may be consistent with various alternative
theories. Nevertheless, the current versions of the most popular alternative approaches
are not easily reconciled with the findings. For example, the emphasis of Williamson’s
TCE approach that vertical integration circumvents holdup problems would be consis-
tent with the positive association between vertical integration and producer technology
intensity, but not with the negative effect of supplier technology intensity. Theories
based on supply assurance (e.g., Green, 1986, Bolton and Whinston, 1993) could also
account for part of the results if more technology-intensive firms require more assurance.
But these theories do not provide an explanation for why greater technology intensity of
suppliers is associated with less vertical integration. Theories based on securing intellec-
tual property rights (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994b) could account for both main effects
of producer and supplier technology intensity, for example, because creating a vertically-
integrated structure may provide better protection of intellectual property rights. These
theories would not explain why these effects become stronger when the share of costs is
high. A theoretical investigation of various alternative explanations for these patterns,
as well as further empirical analysis of the robustness of these results with data from
other countries, appear to be interesting areas for future research.
Finally, as noted above, we organized the data in this paper so as to measure the
likelihood of a firm being integrated with one or multiple input suppliers. This makes our
measure of vertical integration conceptually similar to backward vertical integration. In
this light, the fact that our results are consistent with the theory when the relevant choice
is between backward vertical integration and non-integration is reassuring. Nevertheless,
30
it would be interesting to rearrange the data so as to have empirical measures that
are closer to forward vertical integration and investigate the empirical determinants
of backward and forward vertical integration simultaneously. We believe that a more
systematic investigation (and measurement) of joint determination of backward and
forward integration, and how they interact with industry structure, are promising areas
for future research.
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8. Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting the optimal investments given by (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.5), social
surplus under the three organizational forms is obtained as:
SV IB = 1 +
1
2
p2 +
φ
2
λ
µ
1− λ
4
¶
s2,
SNI = 1 +
µ
1− 2− φ
4
¶µ
1− φ
2
¶
p2 +
φ
2
(1 + θ)
µ
1− 1 + θ
4
¶
s2, (A1)
SV IF = 1 +
1
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µ
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0
4
¶
p2 +
φ
2
s2.
Let
∆B ≡ SV IB − SNI = φ2p2/8− (3− θ − λ) (1 + θ − λ)φs2/8.
It is straightforward to verify that ∆B is increasing in p, decreasing in s, and ∆B = 0 if
and only if
p
s
=
p
(3− θ − λ) (1 + θ − λ) /φ ≡ r > 0.
When p/s > r, backward integration is preferred to non-integration. When p/s < r, it
is dominated by non-integration. Differentiation establishes that ∂r∂φ < 0 and
∂r
∂θ > 0.
Similarly, let
∆F ≡ SV IF − SNI = −
³
(2− λ0)2 − φ2
´
p2/8 + φ (1− θ)2 s2/8.
∆F is decreasing in p and increasing in s. ∆F = 0 if and only if
p
s
=
s
φ (1− θ)2
(2− λ0)2 − φ2
≡ r > 0.
When p/s < r, forward integration is preferred to non-integration. In contrast, when
p/s > r, non-integration is preferred. Again, differentiation establishes that ∂r∂φ > 0 and
∂r
∂θ < 0.
First, suppose that r < r. Then, the analysis so far establishes that the equilibrium
organizational form is given by
z∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
V IB if ps ≥ r
NI if ps ∈ (r, r)
V IF if ps ≤ r
.
The set of parameters such that r < r is non-empty. For instance, as θ → 1 we have
that r→ 0, whereas r→ (2− λ) /
√
φ > 0.
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Next, suppose that r ≥ r. Then NI is always dominated by either V IF and V IB.
Let
∆BF ≡ SV IB − SV IF = (2− λ0)2 p2/8− φ (2− λ)2 s2/8.
∆BF is increasing in p and decreasing in s, and also ∆BF = 0 if and only if
p
s
>
2− λ
2− λ0
p
φ ≡ br.
When p/s > br, backward integration is preferred to forward integration, and when p/s <br, forward integration is preferred. Differentiation establishes that ∂?r∂φ > 0 and∂?r∂θ = 0.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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9. Appendix B: Data Sources and Construction
Our main source of data is the plant level production data underlying the UK Census
of Production (ARD). This is collected by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS)
and firms have a legal obligation to reply. We use the data on all manufacturing plants
from 1996-2001, along with information from the Input-Output Domestic Use Table for
1995, to measure vertical integration and other firm characteristics. We use data from
the ARD from 1992-1995 to measure a number of other industry characteristics and
data from the annual Business Enterprise Researcher and Development (BERD) survey
from 1994-1995 to measure R&D expenditure at the industry level. US variables are
measured using the US Census data at the 4-digit level (available on the NBER web
site). The UK and US data are matched based on a mapping of UK SIC92 to US SIC87
and then aggregated up to input-output industry level. See Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith
and Zilibotti (2004) for further discussion of the data.
9.1. The Plant-Level Production Data
The ARD contains information on all production activity located in the UK. The basic
unit for which information on inputs and output is reported is a reporting unit. A
reporting unit can be a single plant or a group of plants owned by the same firm operating
in the same 4-digit industry. Information on the location and number of employees is
available on all plants (called local units) within each reporting unit. There are over
150,000 reporting units in manufacturing industries with non-zero employment in the
ARD each year 1996-2000. Detailed data is collected from a random stratified sample.32
Data on value-added and costs for non-sampled reporting units are imputed.
Single plant firms are identified as those reporting units which represent only one
plant and which have no sibling, parent or child plants. Single plants with fewer than
20 employees are dropped from the analysis, resulting in between 100,000 - 130,000
reporting units being dropped per year. In addition 1,000 - 2,000 reporting units per
year, which are owned by foreign firms are dropped, as we do not observe their foreign
activities.
Plants in the ARD in these years are classified by their major product according to the
1992 revision of the 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC code). Input-output
(IO) tables are reported at the 2/3-digit level. Where more than one reporting unit exists
32The sampling probabilities vary over time, with industry and with reporting unit size. Reporting
units with 100 or more employees are always sampled. Below that the sampling probabilities range
from 1 in 5 to 1 in 2.
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within an IO industry these are aggregated so that there is only one observation per firm
in each IO industry. The total number of firms used (after dropping the small and single
and foreign owned firms and averaging over years) is 46,392. We measure firm age in
each producing industry as the number of years since the first plant in that industry
was established. We measure firm size in each industry by the number of employees it
has in that industry. The average number of firms in an industry is measured from the
ARD. Table 1 (in the main text) shows means for these variables.
9.2. The Input-Output Table
We use the Input-Output table for 1995.33 The Input-Output table contains information
on 77 manufacturing industries (supplying and producing). There are 5,929 pairs of
producing-supplying industries, for which 3,840 the input-output table indicates positive
trade flows. For each industry pair we calculate the proportion of total costs (including
intermediate, labour and capital) of producing j that are made up of input k, denoted
wjk. In 2,766, or just under half of industry pairs, at least one firm is vertically integrated
to some extent. Table A.1 contains descriptive statistics on the share of output from
each supplying industry that is sold for intermediate consumption, to all industries and
to manufacturing industries, and shows the largest purchasing industry along with the
share of sales this purchaser represents (which ranges from a half of a percent to over
fifty percent and averages 3.7%) and the share of the purchaser’s total costs this input
represents (which ranges from zero to 37% and averages 2.7%).
9.3. Technology Indicators
Our measures of technology intensity are all at the industry level. R&D intensity is
measured using the micro data underlying the annual Business Enterprise Research
and Development (BERD) matched to the ARD. The micro data is aggregated to the
industry level using the product code for which the R&D was targeted. This is scaled by
total value-added in firms producing in the industry (including both R&D and non-R&D
doing firms).
The ratio of physical investment (capital expenditure on machinery, buildings, land
and vehicles) to value-added is constructed in a similar manner from the ARD data at
the industry level and averaged over the years 1992-1995.
33This is available at www.statistics.gov.uk.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
(s.d.) 
Producer R&D Supplier R&D 
  low high low high 
Mean ijkvi   0.008 
(0.087) 
0.007 
(0.078) 
0.010 
(0.096) 
0.008 
(0.084) 
0.009 
(0.089) 
Mean of ijkvi  0.009 
(0.091) 
0.009 
(0.093) 
0.013 
(0.114) 
0.010 
(0.101) 
0.011 
(0.104) 
Firm age 10 
(7) 
10 
(7) 
10 
(7) 
10 
(7) 
10 
(7) 
Firm employment 111 
(455) 
99 
(346) 
125 
(559) 
109 
(444) 
112 
(465) 
Share of producer costs (jk) 0.010 
(0.034) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
0.010 
(0.029) 
0.012 
(0.040) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
Producing industry      
R&D over value-added 0.027 
(0.055) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.055 
(0.072) 
0.026 
(0.055) 
0.028 
(0.055) 
Investment over value-added 0.101 
(0.041) 
0.095 
(0.031) 
0.109 
(0.049) 
0.102 
(0.040) 
0.101 
(0.041) 
Mean number of firms in industry 5757 
(6585) 
8267 
(7978) 
2763 
(1635) 
5755 
(6525) 
5759 
(6636) 
Supplying industry      
R&D over value-added 0.046 
(0.107) 
0.044 
(0.103) 
0.050 
(0.113) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.082 
(0.137) 
Investment over value-added 0.122 
(0.057) 
0.123 
(0.057) 
0.122 
(0.057) 
0.106 
(0.038) 
0.136 
(0.067) 
Mean number of firms in industry 2316 
(3730) 
2320 
(3727) 
2309 
(3733) 
3347 
(5065) 
1433 
(1471) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: ijkvi  is a continuous measure of the share of the producers demand can be met by its own supply. ijkvi is a dummy for whether a firm owns plants in both 
producing and supplying industries. Share of producer costs (jk) is the share of producers in industry j total costs (including labour and capital) that is on input k (from 
the Input-Output Table). The sample contains 2,973,008 observations on 46,392 firms. Numbers reported are means (standard deviations). The first column reports on 
the whole sample. Subsequent columns split the sample by median producer R&D and supplier R&D intensities.
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Table 2: Main results – R&D intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dependent variable: 
ijkvi  
      
       
       
Share of costs (jk)   0.204 0.187 0.187 0.182 
   (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
R&D intensity,  0.038  0.040 0.044 0.037 0.030 
producing (j) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
x Share of costs    1.112 1.104 1.067 
    (0.402) (0.397) (0.374) 
R&D intensity,   -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 
supplying (k)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
x Share of costs    -0.909 -0.914 -0.871 
    (0.353) (0.351) (0.324) 
ln Firm size (ij)     0.0053 0.0052 
            (0.0002) (0.0002) 
ln Firm age (ij)     0.0010 0.0009 
            (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ln Average firm size,       0.0011 
producing (j)      (0.0005) 
ln Average firm size,       -0.0036 
supplying (k)      (0.0004) 
ln Average firm age,       0.012 
producing (j)      (0.003) 
ln Average firm age,       0.004 
supplying (k)      (0.002) 
       
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at 
any time over the years 1996-2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm-industry pair level. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. The RHS variables firm 
size and firm age are measured at the firm-industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters 
that industry pair after 1996). R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value-added 
produced in the UK, taken from plant level R&D data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit industry level and 
average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and is at the industry 
pair level. Average firm size and age are calculated from the firm-industry pair data and average over the 
years 1996-2001. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means.  
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Table 3: Within firm variation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
dependent variable: ijkvi  ijkvi  ijkvi  = 1 if 
multi 
product 
ijkvi  
Share of costs (jk) 0.434 0.434 0.414 0.025 0.475 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) (0.094) (0.058) 
R&D intensity, producing (j) 0.073 0.024 0.014 0.333 0.030    
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.012) 
x Share of costs 2.725 2.786 2.607 -0.058    2.741 
 (0.917) (0.880) (0.816) (1.048) (0.915) 
R&D intensity, supplying (k) -0.041 -0.042 -0.021 0.019    -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.005) 
x Share of costs -2.434 -2.543 -2.303 0.914 -2.482 
 (0.897) (0.865) (0.786) (0.990) (0.891) 
ln Firm size (ij)   0.0024 0.0044     
          (0.0004) (0.0008)  
ln Firm age (ij)   00004 0.0076     
          (0.0005) (0.0007)  
ln Average firm size,    0.003 0.014     
producing (j)   (0.002) (0.005)  
ln Average firm size,    -0.012 -0.0005  
supplying (k)   (0.001) (0.0042)  
ln Average firm age,    -0.006  0.352  
producing (j)   (0.010) (0.021)  
ln Average firm age,    0.017 -0.0019  
supplying (k)   (0.005) (0.0224)  
      
Observations 891,942 891,942 891,942 2,973,008 891,942 
Fixed effects no 6,713 firms 6,713 firms no no 
      
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: In columns (1)-(3) and (5) the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically 
integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996-2001. In column (4) the dependent variable 
is whether or not the observations is for a multi-plant firm. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the level of 3,840 industry pairs.  R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value-added 
produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit industry level and average over 
the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and is at the industry pair level. In 
regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means.  
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Table 4: Instrumental variables 
dependent variable: ijkvi  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Share of costs (jk) 0. 183  0.054 -0.085 0.210 
 (0.028)  (0.069) (0.081) (0.134) 
R&D intensity,  0. 492  0.627 -1.025 0.418 
producing (j) (0.061)  (0.077) (0.239) (0.246) 
x Share of costs   9.832 29.763 22.288 
   (4.207) (6.773) (7.977) 
R&D intensity,  -0.158  -0.202 -0.497 -1.158 
supplying (k) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.089) (0.198) 
x Share of costs   -7.519 -16.872 -8.561 
   (3.733) (4.884) (6.042) 
First stage producing industry R&D intensity    
US producing industry 
investment intensity 
0.172 
(0.029) 
 0.177 
(0.029) 
-0.059 
(0.027) 
-0.158   
(0.017) 
x Share of costs   0.786 
(0.814) 
0.506 
(0.580) 
0.333    
(0.429) 
US supplying industry 
investment intensity 
0.011 
(0.022) 
 0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.007   
(0.013) 
x Share of costs   -1.121 
(0.515) 
-0.576 
(0.365) 
-0.363   
(0.261) 
F-stat P-value 0.000  0.000 0.091 0.000 
R2 0.007  0.007 0.175 0.487 
First stage supplying industry  R&D intensity    
US producing industry 
investment intensity 
-0.028 
(0.082) 
 -0.010 
(0.081) 
-0.033 
(0.084) 
-0.040   
(0.083) 
x Share of costs   4.272 
(1.436) 
3.812 
(1.034) 
4.207   
(1.521) 
US supplying industry 
investment intensity 
0.366 
(0.060) 
 0.356 
(0.60) 
0.093 
(0.056) 
0.063   
(0.056) 
x Share of costs   -3.635 
(1.136) 
-3.268 
(1.046) 
-3.254   
(1.188) 
F-stat (P-value) 0.000  0.000 0.015 0.029 
R2 0.024  0.236 0.069 0.065 
Observations 2,973,008  2,973,008 2,973,008 891,942 
Fixed effects no  no no yes 
covariates no  no yes yes 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at 
any time over the years 1996-2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 
industry pairs. Covariates included in columns (3) and (4) are: producing firm size, age, mean firm size and 
mean firm age in producing and supplying industries.  R&D intensity is R&D and investment carried out in 
the UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit 
industry level and average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and 
is at the industry pair level. In regression with interactions, all main effects evaluated at sample means. 
Instruments are investment intensity in the same industry in the US. 
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Table  5: LPM and probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
dependent variable: ijkvi  LPM PROBIT  PROBIT LPM PROBIT  PROBIT LPM PROBIT  PROBIT 
  marginal 
effectsa 
mean of 
marginal 
effectsb 
 marginal 
effectsa  
mean of 
marginal 
effectsb 
 marginal 
effectsa  
mean of 
marginal 
effectsb 
          
Share of costs (jk) 0.204 0.090 0.094 0.187 0.088 0.092 0.182 0.072 0.087 
 (0.029) (0.007) min 0.044 
max 1.087 
(0.028) (0.007) min 0.014 
max 1.059 
(0.027) (0.006) min 0.002 
max 1.306 
R&D intensity,  0.040 0.027 0.029 0.044 0.024 0.026 0.030 0.010 0.013 
producing (j) (0.005) (0.002) min 0.014 max 0.331 
(0.005) (0.003) min 0.004 
max 0.293 
(0.005) (0.002) min 0.0003 
max 0.188 
x Share of costs    1.112 0.293 0.572 1.067 0.171 0.337 
    (0.402) (0.126) min 0.146 max 14.104 
(0.374) (0.080) min 0.007 
max 8.230 
R&D intensity,  -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
supplying (k) (0.001) (0.002) min -0.114 
max -0.005 
(0.003) (0.002) min -0.101 
max -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) min -0.011 
max  -0.00001 
x Share of costs    -0.909 -0.271 -0.384 -0.871 -0.140 -0.199 
    (0.353) (0.149) min -7.189 max 0.027 
(0.324) (0.099) min -4.298 
max -0.004 
          
Covariates no no no no no no yes yes yes 
a Evaluated at mean value of explanatory variables b Calculated for each individual observation using Ai and Norton (2004) formula. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at any time over the years 1996-2001. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. Covariates included in columns (7)-(9) are: producing firm size, age, mean firm size and mean 
firm age in producing and supplying industries.  R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level 
data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit industry level and average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and is at the industry pair 
level. 
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Table 6: Alternative technology measure – Investment intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dependent variable: 
ijkvi  
      
       
       
Share of costs (jk)   0.203 0.191 0.191 0.187 
   (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Investment intensity,  0.027  0.030 0.038 0.021 -0.002 
producing (j) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
x Share of costs    1.488 1.471 1.402 
    (0.456) (0.460) (0.453) 
Investment intensity,   -0.050 -0.046 -0.055 -0.055 -0.041 
supplying (k)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
x Share of costs    -1.681 -1.666 -1.562 
    (0.490) (0.487) (0.489) 
ln Firm size (ij)     0.0054 0.0052 
            (0.0002) (0.0002) 
ln Firm age (ij)     0.0009 0.0008 
            (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ln Average firm size,       0.0023 
producing (j)      (0.0006) 
ln Average firm size,       -0.0024 
supplying (k)      (0.0004) 
ln Average firm age,       0.011 
producing (j)      (0.003) 
ln Average firm age,       0.004 
supplying (k)      (0.002) 
       
       
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at 
any time over the years 1996-2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm-industry pair level. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 3,840 industry pairs. Investment intensity is 
investment carried out in the UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level 
investment data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit industry level and average over the years 1994-1995. Share of 
costs is from the 1995 input-output table and is at the industry pair level. Firm size and firm age are 
measured at the firm-industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters that industry pair after 
1996). Average firm size and age are calculated from the firm-industry pair data and average over the years 
1996-2001. In regression with interactions, all main effects are evaluated at sample means. 
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Table 7: Outside option  
dependent variable: ijkvi  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Technology measure = R&D 
intensity 
Technology measure = 
Investment intensity 
     
Share of costs (jk) 0.154 0.328 0.161 0.359 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.024) (0.039) 
technology,  0.029 0.010 -0.002 -028 
producing (j) (0.005) (0.016) (0.007) (0.027) 
x Share of costs 0.863 1.571 1.352 0.358 
 (0.338) (0.628) (0.440) (1.330) 
technology,  -0.004 -0.005 -0.031 -0.073 
supplying (k) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) 
x Share of costs -0.762 -1.313 -1.282 0.400 
 (0.287) (0.595) (0.475) (1.129) 
ln Firm size (ij) 0.0052 0.0024 0.0052 0.0023 
        (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
ln Firm age (ij) 0.0009 0.0004 0.0009 0.0003 
        (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
ln Average firm size, -0.0012 0.016 -0.0001 0.003 
producing (j) (0.0006) (0.002) (0.0006) (0.002) 
ln Average firm size, -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0029 0.0008 
supplying (k) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
ln Average firm age,  0.010 -0.004 0.009 -0.004 
producing (j) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
ln Average firm age,  0.017 0.021 0.017 0.023 
supplying (k) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
ln number of firms,  -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0004 
producing (j) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003) (-0.0009) 
ln number of firms,  0.0055 0.019 0.0053 0.019 
supplying (k) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.002) 
     
Observations 2,973,008 891,942 2,973,008 891,942 
Fixed effects no yes no yes 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that 
industry pair at any time over the years 1996-2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the level of 3,840 industry pairs. R&D and investment intensity are R&D and investment in the 
UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the 
2/3-digit industry level and average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 
input-output table and is at the industry pair level. Firm size and firm age are measured at the 
firm-industry pair level in 1996 (age is equal to 1 if the firm enters that industry pair after 1996). 
Average firm size and age are averages over the years 1996-2001. In regression with interactions, 
all main effects are evaluated at sample mean. 
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Table A.1: Summary of input-output table statistics 
Supplying industry % sales for intermediate 
consumption 
Largest purchasing industry % of total 
supplying 
industry sales 
going to this 
purchaser 
% of total 
purchasing industry 
purchases coming 
from this supplier 
 all industries manufacturing    
8 Meat processing                             0.441 0.250  29 Leather goods                              0.019 0.502 
9 Fish and fruit processing                   0.461 0.195  9 Fish and fruit processing                   0.085 0.141 
10 Oils and fats                              0.694 0.534  10 Oils and fats processing                   0.161 0.208 
11 Dairy products                             0.403 0.183  11 Dairy products                             0.109 0.143 
12 Grain milling and starch                   0.666 0.580  14 Bread biscuits etc                         0.192 0.191 
13 Animal feed                                0.751 0.020  8 Meat processing                             0.017 0.009 
14 Bread biscuits etc                         0.433 0.009  14 Bread biscuits etc                         0.001 0.002 
15 Sugar                                      0.817 0.639  16 Confectionery                              0.217 0.153 
16 Confectionery                              0.380 0.160  16 Confectionery                              0.097 0.176 
17 Other food products                        0.332 0.137  17 Other food products                        0.043 0.075 
18 Alcoholic beverages                        0.100 0.070  18 Alcoholic beverages                        0.065 0.127 
19 Soft drinks and mineral waters             0.192 0.003  19 Soft drinks & mineral waters              0.003 0.005 
20 Tobacco products                           0.001 0.001  20 Tobacco products                           0.001 0.001 
21 Textile fibres                             0.681 0.646  27 Knitted goods                              0.189 0.269 
22 Textile weaving                            0.274 0.261 28 Wearing apparel & fur products           0.158 0.092 
23 Textile finishing                          0.976 0.415  23 Textile finishing                          0.053 0.129 
24 Made-up textiles                           0.193 0.052  24 Made-up textiles                           0.010 0.026 
25 Carpets and rugs                           0.356 0.115  25 Carpets and rugs                           0.004 0.009 
26 Other textiles                             0.513 0.427 28 Wearing apparel & fur products           0.203 0.109 
27 Knitted goods                              0.030 0.019 28 Wearing apparel & fur products           0.013 0.013 
28 Wearing apparel and fur products           0.099 0.018 28 Wearing apparel & fur products           0.017 0.048 
29 Leather goods                              0.312 0.078  30 Footwear                                   0.042 0.076 
30 Footwear                                   0.219 0.065  30 Footwear                                   0.064 0.177 
31 Wood and wood products                     0.894 0.519  31 Wood and wood products                    0.203 0.395 
32 Pulp paper and paperboard                  0.672 0.559  33 Paper and paperboard products            0.243 0.285 
33 Paper and paperboard products              0.885 0.520 33 Paper and paperboard products            0.055 0.133 
34 Printing and publishing                    0.613 0.211  34 Printing and publishing                    0.132 0.334 
35 Coke ovens refined petroleum & nuclear         0.450 0.108  38 Organic chemicals                          0.013 0.093 
36 Industrial gases and dyes                  0.535 0.459  19 Soft drinks & mineral waters              0.089 0.120 
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Supplying industry % sales for intermediate 
consumption 
Largest purchasing industry % of total 
supplying 
industry sales 
going to this 
purchaser 
% of total 
purchasing industry 
purchases coming 
from this supplier 
 all industries manufacturing    
37 Inorganic chemicals                        0.676 0.603  37 Inorganic chemicals                        0.043 0.111 
38 Organic chemicals                          0.056 0.052  41 Pesticides                                 0.005 0.051 
39 Fertilisers                                0.839 0.154  39 Fertilisers                                0.146 0.273 
40 Plastics & Synthetic resins etc            0.599 0.557  48 Plastic products                           0.249 0.209 
41 Pesticides                                 0.508 0.006  41 Pesticides                                 0.001 0.005 
42 Paints varnishes printing ink etc           0.692 0.477  42 Paints varnishes printing ink etc          0.054 0.107 
43 Pharmaceuticals                            0.380 0.125  43 Pharmaceuticals                            0.094 0.206 
44 Soap and toilet preparations               0.229 0.105  44 Soap and toilet preparations               0.085 0.146 
45 Other Chemical products                    0.185 0.116  45 Other Chemical products                    0.033 0.085 
46 Man-made fibres                            0.273 0.259  21 Textile fibres                             0.058 0.100 
47 Rubber products                            0.552 0.243  47 Rubber products                            0.041 0.102 
48 Plastic products                           0.759 0.405  48 Plastic products                           0.081 0.179 
49 Glass and glass products                   0.775 0.549  49 Glass and glass products                   0.133 0.276 
50 Ceramic goods                              0.402 0.125  50 Ceramic goods                              0.046 0.113 
51 Structural clay products                   0.723 0.003  51 Structural clay products                   0.001 0.004 
52 Cement lime and plaster                    0.882 0.336  53 Articles of concrete stone etc             0.286 0.136 
53 Articles of concrete stone etc             0.851 0.024  53 Articles of concrete stone etc             0.022 0.044 
54 Iron and steel                             0.596 0.561  54 Iron and steel                             0.138 0.253 
55 Non-ferrous metals                         0.658 0.611  55 Non-ferrous metals                         0.218 0.450 
56 Metal castings                             0.973 0.790  62 Mechanical power equipment               0.175 0.107 
57 Structural metal products                  0.472 0.115  57 Structural metal products                  0.025 0.050 
58 Metal boilers and radiators                0.348 0.158  58 Metal boilers & radiators                  0.084 0.174 
59 Metal forging pressing etc                 0.964 0.864  80 Aircraft and spacecraft                    0.077 0.212 
60 Cutlery tools etc                          0.545 0.453  60 Cutlery tools etc                          0.024 0.063 
61 Other metal products                       0.690 0.563  71 Insulated wire and cable                   0.014 0.114 
62 Mechanical power equipment                 0.285 0.210 62 Mechanical power equipment               0.055 0.125 
63 General purpose machinery                  0.202 0.110  63 General purpose machinery                 0.020 0.042 
64 Agricultural machinery                     0.132 0.009  64 Agricultural machinery                     0.006 0.015 
65 Machine tools                              0.181 0.133  65 Machine tools                              0.011 0.023 
66 Special purpose machinery                  0.293 0.246  66 Special purpose machinery                 0.046 0.102 
67 Weapons and ammunition                     0.554 0.170 67 Weapons and ammunition                    0.154 0.336 
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Supplying industry % sales for intermediate 
consumption 
Largest purchasing industry % of total 
supplying 
industry sales 
going to this 
purchaser 
% of total 
purchasing industry 
purchases coming 
from this supplier 
 all industries manufacturing    
68 Domestic appliances nec                    0.187 0.019  68 Domestic appliances nec                    0.007 0.014 
69 Office machinery & computers               0.060 0.049  69 Office machinery & computers            0.035 0.094 
70 Electric motors and generators etc           0.390 0.301 70 Electric motors and generators etc       0.072 0.165 
71 Insulated wire and cable                   0.550 0.304  71 Insulated wire and cable                   0.031 0.073 
72 Electrical equipment nec                   0.491 0.388 74 Transmitters for TV radio and phone   0.112 0.274 
73 Electronic components                      0.126 0.115 69 Office machinery & computers            0.048 0.052 
74 Transmitters for TV radio and phone           0.204 0.020 74 Transmitters for TV radio and phone   0.014 0.032 
75 Receivers for TV and radio                 0.134 0.091  75 Receivers for TV and radio                0.055 0.126 
76 Medical and precision instruments           0.360 0.129 76 Medical and precision instruments       0.036 0.090 
77 Motor vehicles                             0.200 0.112  64 Agricultural machinery                     0.005 0.200 
78 Shipbuilding and repair                    0.536 0.061  78 Shipbuilding and repair                    0.061 0.142 
79 Other transport equipment                  0.275 0.154  79 Other transport equipment                  0.152 0.305 
80 Aircraft and spacecraft                    0.107 0.011  80 Aircraft and spacecraft                    0.011 0.029 
81 Furniture                                  0.233 0.077  81 Furniture                                  0.053 0.114 
82 Jewellery and related products             0.020 0.017  82 Jewellery & related products              0.016 0.044 
83 Sports goods and toys                      0.014 0.001  12 Grain milling and starch                   0.001 0.001 
84 Miscellaneous manufacturing nec & recycl      0.543 0.406  56 Metal castings                             0.034 0.117 
Source: United Kingdom Office of National Statistics, 1995 Input Output Tables 
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Table A.2: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
dependent variable: 
ijkvi  
exclude bottom quartiles 
of firms by size 
exclude top quartiles of 
firms by size 
dependent variable: 
ijkvi  
  
Share of costs (jk) 0.201 0.103 0.114 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.016) 
R&D intensity,  0.030 0.014 0.022 
producing (j) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
x Share of costs 1.146 0.477 0.554 
 (0.389) (0.254) (0.224) 
R&D intensity,  -0.0074 -0.005 -0.004 
supplying (k) (0.0038) (0.002) (0.002) 
x Share of costs -0.953 -0.474 -0.413 
 (0.352) (0.211) (0.199) 
    
Observations 2,249,095 2,234,459 2,973,008 
Covariates yes yes yes 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that 
industry pair at any time over the years 1996-2001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the industry pair level. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the UK divided by value-added 
produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit industry level and 
average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and is at the 
industry pair level. In regression with interactions, all main effects evaluated at sample means. 
Covariates in all specifications include: firm size and age, producing and supplying  industry 
average size and average age.
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Table A.3: Nonlinearities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dependent variable: ijkvi      
     
Share of cost:     
2nd quartile   0.0027 0.0024 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) 
3rd quartile   0.0092 0.0081 
   (0.0007) (0.0006) 
4th quartile   0.0186 0.0176 
   (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Producing industry R&D intensity:    
  2nd quartile 0.0036  0.0034 0.0015 
 (0.0010)  (0.0009) (0.0008) 
  3rd quartiles 0.0050  0.0040 0.0028 
 (0.0010)  (0.0009) (0.0008) 
  4th quartile 0.0057  0.0049 0.0029 
 (0.0010)  (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Supplying industry R&D intensity:    
  2nd quartile  -0.0080 -0.0062 -0.0049 
  (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
  3rd quartiles  -0.0039 -0.0019 0.0002 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
  4th quartile  -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0008 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
     
Covariates no no no yes 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations using the United Kingdom Office of National Statistics data. All statistical 
results remain Crown Copyright.  
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a firm is vertically integrated in that industry pair at 
any time over the years 1996-2001. There are 2,973,008 observations at the firm-industry pair level.  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level indicated. R&D intensity is R&D carried out in the 
UK divided by value-added produced in the UK, taken from plant level data, aggregated to the 2/3-digit 
industry level and average over the years 1994-1995. Share of costs is from the 1995 input-output table and 
is at the industry pair level. Covariates included where indicated are: producing firm size, age, mean firm 
size and mean firm age in producing and supplying industries. The reference group is zero share of costs 
and bottom quartiles of R&D intensity in producing and supplying industries.  
 
